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Abstract  
Who is entitled to surf a wave? Despite its boom, surfing has seen little formal regulation of ocean 
waves, the scarce and precious resource at the heart of the sport. Among the few best practices that 
have emerged, surfers either wait their turn or take off on a wave when they are closer to the breaking 
point than others. However, three informal doctrines tacitly rule the sport and challenge the authority 
of such formal rules. Around the globe, surfers claim special rights to waves on behalf of their local 
affiliation to a spot, their better skills or their longer experience. This paper examines the moral plau-
sibility of these informal doctrines – localism, performance, and seniority –, confronting them with 
theories of distributive justice. The analysis suggests that none of the three matters intrinsically, but 
that we need to add additional criteria to the local, high performing, or experienced surfer’s claim to 
make it plausible. 
Keywords:  Surfing, Waves; Distributive Justice, Ethics; Localism, Performance, Seniority 
1. Introduction 
In Political Philosophy, surfing has so far only been a memorable illustration used by a few aut-
hors. As unproductive but harmless beach bums, surfers have served Philippe van Parijs (1991) 
to defend his proposal of an unconditional basic income. Alongside climbing, it has been discus-
sed as an example of reckless gambles for which an agent may be liable – a question that bears 
on what society owes practitioners of risky sports and on hypothetical insurance markets. Such 
topics concern surfers and the wider non-surfing society. However in this paper, the focus lies on 
the surfing community from the inside, discussing the norms that rule the appropriation and en-
joyment of the ocean.  
The sport has become more and more popular over the last decades. With an increasing number 
of surfers all over the globe, overcrowding of surf spots has become a serious issue. Battles over 
the distribution of waves have occasionally resulted in acts of severe violence – prominently 
executed by surf gangs like the well-mediatised Bra Boys (2007) from Maroubra Beach, Sydney, 
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Australia. In other cases, the surfing community has witnessed privatization of surf spots, such as 
in the Maldives (Surfermag, 2012). The struggle for the scarce resource of surfing waves can be 
examined in terms of distributive justice, which this paper attempts to do. 
From the inside of the community, two sets of rules have emerged to regulate crowded surf 
breaks. One the one hand, we find two formal rules that are promoted by surf clubs and associa-
tions as an attempt to codify behaviour in surfing. Section 3 outlines that the doing-turns as well 
as the closest-to-the-peak rules are both egalitarian in principle, as they don’t privilege any spe-
cial group of surfers. On the other hand, informal priority rules have emerged which challenge 
the authority of the formal codes. Namely, surfers claim special priority over others on the 
grounds of their local affiliation to a surf spot, their better surfing skills, or their longer experien-
ce as a surfer. We can call these informal rules the three ‘doctrines’ of wave distribution which 
shall be labelled localism, performance and seniority.   1
In practice, the doctrines often rule the sport. Mechanisms to exclude surfers from breaks can 
happen in or outside the water – including verbal claims, physical demonstrations of superiority 
such as dropping in on other surfers  or violence against things (broken fins or surfboards or flat2 -
tened car tyres) and against persons (such as beatings). Surfers are excluded in manifold forms, 
from friendly but firm to aggressive. As one of the few scholars concerned with the topic, Steve 
Olivier (2010) groups these forms of exclusion under the banner of localism, advocating the po-
sitive effects of showing good manner in the water on an account of virtue ethics. Olivier’s prac-
tical proposal is based on a rejection of the idea that the notion of surfing can operate in a special 
moral context (ibid: 1223). 
Yet this is exactly what this paper aims at, as it sheds light on the rationales and justifications that 
motivate the special claims to which localism, performance or seniority might refer. To critically 
 The essay refers to ‘doctrines’ as a set of beliefs that surfers refer to in questions of wave distribution in order to 1
avoid confusion with the tools of distributive justice – equality, utility, priority etc. – which are usually termed ‘prin-
ciples’ (Arneson, 2013).
 Throughout the paper, surfing jargon is explained to non-surfers using footnotes. In surfing, ‘dropping in on some2 -
one‘ refers to stealing the wave from another surfer who is already riding on it by dropping down the face of the 
wave in front of him. 
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examine the three doctrines, it asks how plausible they are when confronted with theories of dis-
tributive justice. An answer to this question is the primary aim of the paper. The secondary aim 
of the discussion will be to extract a coherent set of applicable priority rules for surfing, high-
lighted throughout the text. 
Two terminological clarifications are necessary. First, theories of distributive justice can be con-
cerned with different types of ‘currencies’, that is, the good to be distributed. If not stated diffe-
rently, the paper’s currency is ocean waves for surfing. Second, the term ‘priority’ is used in the 
common sense meaning when we talk about priority rules in surfing as ‘letting someone go on a 
wave before someone else’. This usage only changes when the ‘principle of priority’ of ethics is 
introduced in the last section, the different meaning of which is explained in that section. 
Before we proceed, a potential objection to the focus needs to be anticipated. Topics in applied 
ethics typically deal with questions that have potential implications of life and death or that affect 
large numbers of people. Distributive justice is mostly concerned with assessing questions of in-
come and welfare which are prevalent for us all. Why write a paper about surfing, in presence of 
thousands of potentially more essential topics? 
The reply is simple. Surfing might not matter much for ethics, but ethics definitely matters for 
surfing: To find fair rules in wave distribution for the sport. There is no doubt that the issue of 
surfing interacts with considerations of welfare. The surf industry and surf-related tourism move 
a lot of money around the globe and good waves have become a precious resource in the econo-
mical sense. But it also matters immensely for people personally – think of the many self-decla-
red soul surfers around the planet –, as some surfers claim the sport to be their religion, even if 
this phrase itself has been turned into marketing products (cp. Surfingismyreligion, 2014). 
Some people think that surfers are “happier, friendlier and more relaxed” (The Inertia, 2013) 
human beings when they ride waves. If that is true, such psychological benefits might have broa-
der positive effects on society and thus we would have good reason to care about fair wave dis-
tribution. Even though the author does believe in the happiness claim, speculation about endorp-
hins and other bodily reactions are not of concern here. But we can claim that the use and ow-
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nership of a sought-after resource such as ocean waves is an issue of justice in distribution. Mo-
reover, the code of conduct of an international cultural community like the one of surfers deser-
ves some critical examination.  
The essay will proceed as follows. Exploring the ethics of wave distribution concerns both ap-
propriation and use. The following section demonstrates that the appropriation of waves or surf 
spots is hard to justify. Section (3) sheds light on the existing formal rules of wave distribution. 
The rest of the paper discusses the plausibility of the informal doctrines that can be understood as 
exceptions to the formal rules. In one section each, the plausibility of possible justifications of 
the localist (4), performance- (5) and seniority-claims (6) are assessed in detail. The last section 
(7) introduces an additional consideration based on personal experience, before the conclusion 
(8) sums up the results of the analysis. 
2. Establishing Property Rights over Waves and Surf Breaks? 
One general way for surfers to ground special priority claims would be to establish property 
rights over waves or surf breaks that they call ‘theirs’. Imagine a surfer discovers a new surf 
spot. Can he acquire it and exclude others by making it his own? 
We could think of grounding these kinds of special rights with the account of John Locke’s first 
occupancy theory. Locke’s core idea of acquisition relies on the assumption that everyone ‘owns’ 
themselves which expresses the idea of self-ownership over one’s body and labour. By mixing 
one’s labour with the material world, one can legitimately acquire it. He further stresses that the 
land one occupies has to be cultivated or used productively (Locke, 2008: § 27). The mixing-me-
taphor can be claimed to be true by a surfer riding a wave, assuming he surfs well and makes use 
of the waves.  
We can raise two critical objections to this kind of view. First, Locke’s account obviously aims at 
acquiring land, not waves. Therefore, we need to further assess whether waves (or whatever else) 
might be well-suited to such a claim. The second objection comes with a further qualification 
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that Locke himself attaches to his theory, assessing the entitlement of surfers to establish pro-
perty rights. 
2.1 What Goods can Surfers make Special Claims to? 
Can somebody ‘own’ a wave? Can waves belong to someone? What type of goods are waves? In 
trying to establish property rights over a wave a surfer would have to be able to claim an amount 
of water for himself. But this seems implausible because of the fact that water elements are cons-
tantly moving around surf breaks. Robert Nozick illustrates the absurdity of acquiring unboun-
ded water. If you own a can of tomato juice and you pour it into the ocean, you don’t come to 
acquire the ocean as the molecules mingle (Nozick, 1974: 174). As long as waves break on the 
moving open sea, they can hardly be claimed someone’s property. Thus, Locke’s mixing-metap-
hor is a bit of a stretch here. 
However, some people assume that local surfers own surf breaks (Kaffine, 2007). Thus, we could 
refer to the sea bottom as the good that is claimed property. The two most common types of sea 
bottom generating waves for surfing are sand bars and underwater reef formations. Sand bars are 
loose formations of sediment and are in this regard similar to water or tomato juice: They can 
hardly be claimed property on an open ocean. If we did, our property would soon start spreading 
around the world. Reef formations are more stationary; they can be coral reefs or rocks that 
move very little or not at all during a human’s lifetime.  
Due to these empirical concerns, reef formations are the most likely goods to be claimed as pro-
perty. Note that the most ‘localised’ surf spots are often reef breaks; Pipeline on Hawaii is by 
many seen as the prime example of localism (New York Times, 2009). In other cases, heavily 
crowded and localised waves break on a mixture of sand and rocks such as at Lafitenia in France, 
populated with the industry’s headquarters right in front of it. Of course there are exceptions like 
the famous Mundaka in the Spanish Basque Country which breaks on a long sand bar shaped by 
a river mouth.  
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Locke thinks that “these days the chief issue about property concerns the earth itself rather than 
the plants and animals that live on it, because when you own some of the earth you own what 
lives on it as well” (Locke, 2008: § 32). As an analogy, we can assume that waves are like ani-
mals in this regard, whereas reefs (and, to a lesser extent, sandbars) are like land – and are there-
fore potentially goods open to be claimed property. But can we plausibly establish property 
rights in theory, after all? 
2.2 Leaving Enough and as Good for Others 
To answer this question, we need to have a further look into Locke’s theory of acquisition. The 
philosopher subjects a legitimate acquisition of the earth to an important qualification: By mi-
xing a piece of the earth with one’s labour, one has to make sure to leave enough and adequately 
valuable pieces for others to acquire (Locke, 2008: § 33). This qualification has been called the 
‘enough-and-as-good proviso’ in Locke. The proviso forms the core idea of geoism as “a philo-
sophical tradition […] that affirms the equal claim of all humanity to land and other planetary 
resources” (Casal, 2011: 308-9).  
The egalitarian geoist claim is the counter-perspective towards any surfers claiming special 
rights about ‘their home breaks’. To put it positively, a surfer claiming special rights over a break 
would have to make plausible that he is in fact leaving enough – and as good – ridable waves for 
everyone else. However in practice, this is unlikely to be the case when we consider different 
qualities of surf breaks. Take Lafitenia in South-West France as an example again. The right-
hand point break starts on a rocky ledge, breaking on the very outside before perfectly peeling 
down the crescent shaped bay. On good days, you can ride the wave for 150 meters down the line 
into the picturesque bay. Do surfers who claim the break for themselves leave enough waves for 
others? Indeed, there are certainly several hundred kilometres of ridable beach breaks up north 
the Landes coastline. But there is simply no adequate wave around in terms of quality. 
Surf breaks are special goods. One reason for Locke to endorse the acquisition of earthly resour-
ces in general was his assumption that increased productivity would generate more goods that 
would be available for everyone (Locke, 2008: § 37). Before knowing the whole set of positive 
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and negative implications of growth-driven industrialization, this might have seemed plausible to 
Locke. But the assumption is certainly implausible with regard to surf breaks, as the number of 
breaks in the world – whether it be known or not – remains constant.  3
We conclude that appropriation is not legitimate unless others are compensated. But compensa-
tion in terms of waves of equal quality seems impossible or at least problematic. If ocean waves 
are a good that is potentially open to anyone, what rules should regulate wave use? 
3. Formal Priority Rules in Surfing 
Surfers around the globe find themselves confronted with two formal priority rules in their sport. 
They are both clearly applicable and most surf spots function on one of the two.  
3.1 Pure Equality: Doing Turns 
According to the doing-turns rule, all surfers are equally entitled to a wave and must wait until it 
is their turn to go. The order is fixed and includes all surfers: Surfers who have waited longer in 
the line-up have the right to go before newly arriving surfers – one can compare the functioning 
of the rule to a supermarket queue. The doing-turns rule is mostly used in clean point break situa-
tions where the take-off zone is very small.  By organising momentary proximity of the surfers 4
in the take-off zone, it corresponds to the concept of pure equality in distributive justice as it 
creates equal outcomes (cp. Parfit, 1997: 205). Every surfer gets the same amount of waves. 
3.2 Rough Equality: Closest To the Peak 
According to the closest-to-the-peak rule, the surfer positioned closest to the peak  has the right 5
to go. This rule is mostly used in spots with multiple and shifting peaks like most beach breaks 
 Note that there have been attempts to create artificial reefs for surfing which were not always a success story (The 3
Guardian, 2010).
 A ‘point break’ is created where waves hit a point of land or rocks jutting out from the coastline. The ‘take-off 4
zone’ of a wave is the place in the water where it starts breaking and where surfers begin their rides. Compare 
Wavepark (2012) for a promotion of the doing-turns rule.
 The ‘peak’ of a wave is the highest point of the wave where it starts breaking. 5
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and it is promoted by surf clubs or surfing associations (Surfinghandbook, 2014). The closest-to-
the-peak rule promotes unorganised momentary proximity of the surfers. In contrast to the doing-
turns rule, it promotes rough equality: Who is entitled to catch a wave depends on where the 
wave breaks and how close to the peak surfers are situated in the line-up. Every surfer can possi-
bly catch a wave. Before assessing the challenge of these rules, let us quickly consider one more 
intuition in surfing that can be explained in terms of distributive justice. 
3.3 Pareto Optimality: Don’t Waste Waves 
With regard to surfing, we could appeal to a more demanding view of distributive justice. Accor-
ding to the principle of Pareto optimality, a distribution is sound when it makes someone better 
off without making anyone else worse off (Arneson, 2013: 8). On the account of Pareto egalita-
rianism we can endorse deviations from an equal wave distribution. Pareto egalitarianism allows 
for departures from pure and rough equality, but only if the quantity and quality of rides are in-
creased and thus only benefits accrue. This is a plausible principle because it maximizes benefits 
for everyone without making anyone else worse off. In surfing situations, this obviously suggests 
to occupy every potentially surfable wave without letting good waves go. 
We will later in the paper discuss the ways in which deviations from equality might be permissi-
ble, showing that skill in surfing is intertwined with the quality of waves and respective surfers’ 
wave choices. For the moment, we can note our first practically applicable priority rule: 
First Rule: Don’t leave waves unridden.  
The doing-turns and closest-to-the-peak rules are challenged by the emergence of three informal 
priority doctrines in surfing that can all be seen as deviations from the egalitarian formal rules. 
They claim special rights for local surfers, high performing surfers or experienced senior surfers. 
Following this order, the doctrines are explained in turn and their rationale and plausibility exa-
mined.  
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4. “My Town, My Wave”  : Localism 6
The localism doctrine refers to the surfer’s local affiliation to a spot and/or the wider community 
around the particular break. He makes a claim over territory and asserts to have a special relation 
to it because he resides close-by and is part of the local community. Such a surfer would consider 
a break his ‘home spot’ that he surfs every day. The rationale of the localism doctrine refers to 
the space where the surfing is done. 
Locke’s enough-and-as-good proviso is a strong statement against local surfers claiming their 
‘home breaks’ for themselves. The localist claim is further weakened by the fact that the creation 
of swell is a phenomenon that happens thousands of kilometres offshore in waters that belong to 
nobody (Butt, 2014: 8). But still, the local surfer might find it frustrating to see his backyard 
wave overcrowded with strangers. To put forward the localist claim against the invader, we can 
either calculate the costs and benefits of the situation, we can show that the stranger puts an un-
bearable burden on the local, or try to invoke special birth rights in favour of the latter. 
4.1 Economic Inequality, Costs and Benefits of Local Surfers 
The first way of assessing this question is intuitive, doing a simple calculation in terms of costs 
and benefits for a local surfer when a non-local shows up at ‘his’ surf spot. In many cases of sur-
fing related businesses, benefits outweigh the costs by far. Local residents of surf towns are often 
dependent on tourists to come dining in their restaurants, buy gear and equipment in their local 
surf shops or pay to be taught surf lessons. 
Consider the case of the Hypocrite Surf Instructor smiling and pushing beginners into waves in 
the morning and becoming a shouting aggressor ‘protecting’ himself and his local buddies from 
outsiders attempting to catch ‘their’ waves in the afternoon.  The costs-benefits view dismantles 7
his conduct as implausible because his benefits (making a living) are clearly greater than his 
 The quote is from a local surfer at Ribera d’Ilhas, Ericeira, Portugal, confronting the author’s friend Nikolas in 6
2009 with his particular idea of how wave distribution was supposed to work at ‘his’ spot.
 This is a realistic case that every surfer can witness during summer in popular surf destinations with a lot of surf7 -
ing-related business infrastructure such as in South-West France (author’s experience).
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costs (sharing the waves with strangers in the summer). The same applies for surfing shop-ow-
ners, waiters or cooks in restaurants, and more. A prominent example of such reasoning in poli-
tics is the declaration of a collection of good-quality point breaks in Ericeira, Portugal, under the 
special protectoral status as a ‘World Surfing Reserve’. The rationale for this project, amongst 
others, was to stimulate Portugal’s economy, protect the environment and to ensure the quality of 
life for the residents (World Surfing Reserve, 2014). 
On the other hand, the costs may outweigh the benefits for locals when reckless travellers invade 
a place and cause severe damage. The surfing-related cultural imperialism in Kuta on Bali, Indo-
nesia, might be such a case: Western international travellers disrespect local customs, abuse al-
cohol or recreational drugs and cause severe environmental pollution .  8
4.2 Putting Severe Burdens on Locals 
But is a costs-and-benefits calculation always a good solution to assess whether a non-local sur-
fer inflicts a burden on a local or bestows a benefit? Consider the following objection. Seana 
Shiffrin (1999: 127) imagines a rich man – Wealthy – who has an extravagant hobby: He likes 
flying around with his helicopter dropping gold bars to the earth. One of the 1.5 million dollar 
bars falls down on Unlucky and breaks his arm. Shiffrin thinks that Unlucky has still a reason to 
complain: It may be impermissible to inflict a certain burden on someone, even if you (over-) 
compensate him for the costs. Wealthy has no right to break Unlucky’s arm by dropping a gold 
bar from his helicopter, even if Unlucky gets rich. The same applies for tourists who ‘invade’ lo-
cal surfing communities: One cannot justify putting a severe burden on locals arguing that despi-
te the costs, they benefit overall.  
Local residents might feel offended by tourist masses of surfers coming to their community, crea-
ting fuller line-ups and parking lots or dense traffic. But they would have to show that they have 
special rights as residing surfers – and that visiting surfers infringe those rights. Certainly, local 
 The impression is based on the author’s email correspondence with his friend Helge on 18 June 2014 who com8 -
plained about excesses in techno music as well as drunk, drugged and nude Australians in Kuta. (After these experi-
ences, the witness fled to the inlands of the island.)
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residents could appeal to general rights they possess just as anyone else to convict tourists of 
harming them. In surfing, such cases would involve drop-ins infringing the closest-to-the-peak or 
doing-turns rules. Outside of surfing we could think of littering, assuming that local residents 
(not only surfers) have a right to a clean beach or the right to a quiet sleep.  
Again, this problem is intertwined with general questions of economic inequality. We could ima-
gine the Poor Local Surfer having a special right to surf ‘his home break’ whereas the Rich Tra-
velling Surfer showing up with his precious equipment could simply move on and go somewhere 
else as he possesses not only a fancy camper van but also enough means to spend on petrol and 
the like. But shouldn’t the local poor in this case try and extract some of the rich surfer’s wealth 
(as the Hypocrite Surf Instructor does) instead of sending him away?  
With regard to economic inequality, a local would have to prove that the non-local inflicts a harm 
that he cannot bear, a question that entails a threshold problem. But couldn’t the local simply 
claim special birth rights against the invader? 
4.3 Special Rights for Being Born a Local Surfer? 
Imagine two surfers, a local resident and a traveller showing up at a surf break in the morning at 
the same time. They both regularly surf the break. Can we think of residency as the decisive cri-
terion here? 
For Ronald Dworkin, it makes a moral difference whether one’s success results from factors that 
this person has control over – and is therefore responsible for the outcome – or it results from 
options beyond this control. Dworkin labels the first kind of factors option luck and the second 
kind brute luck (1981: 293). We can plausibly say that the fact where a surfer is born – whether 
on the coastline of the beautiful Basque Country or landlocked in the desert around Zaragoza – is 
a matter of brute luck and should therefore have no impact on how many waves he is entitled to. 
Instead of claiming a special birth right, the Zaragoza surfer simply has bad brute luck whereas 
the local on the coast has good brute luck. Neither of the two should be disadvantaged for that. 
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Furthermore, a surfer who regularly comes to surf a break although he doesn’t live very near – 
let’s say, the Zaragoza surfer is willing to go for a three-hour car ride to the Atlantic every day – 
should not be disadvantaged considering the effort he puts into surfing. On the contrary to privi-
leging the local resident, the commuting surfer might even have a stronger claim to be compen-
sated for the effort and energy he puts in locomotion. Quite contrary to the space-related claim of 
the local, would we actually be inclined to grant priority to him, because he might deserve it? 
Before turning to a more detailed examination of what role desert plays in the distribution of wa-
ves with regard to the surfer’s skill level, let us consider an argument in defence of the local: If 
we considered the amount if kilometres to a surf break as the decisive criterion to privilege trave-
llers over residents, this would entail a vicious circle as surfer a from zone A would have to 
move to zone B, and surfer b to zone C and so on. Nobody could stay in his area, a situation 
which in which local surfers are worse off and therefore is against the principle of Pareto optima-
lity. 
To sum up, the rights of local residents are intertwined with considerations of economic inequa-
lity and costs-benefits calculations are complex and not easy to assess in reality. With regard to 
the problem of what a ‘severe burden’ is, we would need to define a threshold between an accep-
table burden and an unacceptable harm that outsiders put on locals, a problem that goes beyond 
the aim of this paper. As long as such an unacceptable burden is not imposed on local surfers, we 
neither have reason to privilege locals over non-locals nor the other way around. Claiming a spe-
cial birth right is implausible because it is a matter of brute luck where a surfer is born. 
5. “Out of My Way, You Kook” : Performance 9
The performance doctrine refers to how well somebody surfs; it is a claim towards one’s ability 
level. A surfer with a good performance will be able to show a large variety of manoeuvres and 
 According to Surfline’s Surfing A to Z, a ‘kook’ is a “person who can't surf and gets in everyone's way. Someone 9
who pretends to be something they're not. Almost always thinks they surf better than they really can” (Surfline, 
2014).
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will be secure in performing them. The rationale of the performance doctrine refers to the sur-
fer’s skill level. 
To assess the plausibility of the skill claim, it is necessary to distinguish what factors it derives 
from. We can imagine several possible justifications for granting high performing surfers special 
rights to waves: Because the best have worked harder to get to where they are, because they pos-
sess favourable genetic endowments, because they enjoy themselves most, or because they pro-
vide more enjoyment to others watching them. Before examining the latter two options, we will 
discuss two plausible ways of rewarding surfers for their effort and talent as well as the implau-
sible limits of the performance doctrine, namely technical enhancement and other external fac-
tors. Lastly with regard to performance, we will then discuss how skill and wave types are rela-
ted from the view of Pareto egalitarianism. 
5.1 Effort, Compensation and Desert 
High performing surfers could claim they deserve to ride a wave before a worse surfer because 
of their higher performance but such a claim needs to be plausibly motivated. Literature in distri-
butive justice suggests that we can motivate an appeal to desert because of the effort one person 
spends in her activity or for compensating her for the costs she has taken in order to get where 
she is (Arneson, 2013: 26). According to the desert principle – so understood –, a distribution is 
just when it reflects the extent to which a good performance is deserved for the effort one shows. 
We have already suggested that compensating the Zaragoza surfer for his effort in locomotion 
seems plausible but it may entail problematic consequences that are worse for others. 
But surfers could to some extent be compensated for their training in- and outside the water. 
Consider Pauline, who is a regularly engaging surfer, making a lot of effort to get herself into the 
ocean and who sacrifices other things she could do in the meantime. She goes surfing whenever 
she can – even in the gnarliest winter months putting on a lot of thick neoprene and enduring wa-
ter temperatures just above the freezing point. Paul, on the other hand, is an occasional good-
weather surfer who prioritizes other things over surfing. There seems to be no reason why we 
shouldn’t prioritise Pauline over Paul on the desert principle when we look at the striking diffe-
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rence in effort both put into surfing. Pauline, other things being equal, should be rewarded for her 
greater effort.  
A good performance in surfing can result from hard training. But it can also be a simple matter 
of talent or favourable external conditions. We have to further consider these differences. 
5.2 Skill, Talent and Externalities 
One problem when we look at skill solely from the output dimension is that it might rely on fac-
tors outside of people’s control. We can plausibly assume that many factors in becoming a good 
surfer are outside of this surfer’s control, like having the right surfing conditions or being born 
into circumstances favourable to meet possible sponsors – which are a matter of brute luck again 
and are therefore arbitrary. 
However, whether or not natural endowments such as talent should make a moral difference is 
contested in distributive justice (Arneson, 2013: 16). But shouldn’t talent in surfing count in the 
distribution of waves? If it didn’t, we should push the most untalented surfers into great waves. 
This seems counterintuitive as we have strong instrumental reason to let the gifted flourish: They 
can become professionals pushing the sport into new dimensions or they can become good ins-
tructors for the next generation of surfers. The spirit of most sports actually endorses, favours, or 
virtually celebrates differences in natural talent. And most of us think they do so for good reason. 
Assume The Talented Sprinter runs world records solely due to his favourable genetic conditions 
– he trains equally hard as other athletes from his field. Should we make him pull a 20 kilograms 
training sledge when competing against others in order to compensate them for their natural di-
sadvantage? No. Here, just as in surfing, the morality of sports diverges from accounts of distri-
butive justice: Unlike in some cases of economic and social injustices, genetic differences like 
talent are clearly to be rewarded in surfing.  
From these conclusions, we can note the priority rule number two before turning to a further li-
mitation of the performance doctrine: 
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Second Rule: Surfers should, to some extent, be rewarded with waves for their efforts they 
put into and talents they have for surfing. 
5.3 Limiting Performance: Natural Skills and Technical Enhancement 
One illustrative example of why performance is an arbitrary criterion when looked at purely from 
the output side is the Dave Wassel vs. Bodyboarder case. Surfer Wassel used a jet ski to be pulled 
into the waves at the infamous lefthander of Teahupoo, Tahiti, although there were other surfers 
paddling into the waves with their mere hands. By using the ski, Wassel left no chance to padd-
ling surfers to catch the best waves and was eventually dropped in by a bodyboarder who felt 
provoked. The case caused a discussion about priority rules within the surfing community (Indo-
surflife, 2013).  
Dave Wassel vs. Bodyboarder can be compared with the practices of big fishing companies that 
use special radars to detect fish swimming just across international boundaries, catch it quickly 
and thereby leave other nations without fish. In a closest-to-the-peak scenario which is egalita-
rian in principle, fishery companies just as surfers can abuse the criterion of momentary proxi-
mity by putting unfair burdens on their competitors through the use of technology. The case de-
monstrates that technical enhancement of skills is beyond the limits of the morally permissible in 
surfing. But it entails a threshold problem: What is to be counted as unfair ‘technological enhan-
cement’? The analysis suggests that jet skis are. But what about better surfboards, more flexible 
wetsuits for faster paddling or even nutritional supplements for surfers?  
The intention of the paper is not to face these questions here. Instead, let us now turn to the other 
two possible justifications of the performance doctrine, namely the claims that better surfers en-
joy more or provide more enjoyment to those watching them. 
5.4 Personal Utility: Best Waves to Best Surfers? 
We might assume that beginners don’t enjoy surfing one particular wave as much as good sur-
fers. Thus, the more skilled should be entitled to have priority over the less skilled. This claim 
can be explained by the utility principle of political philosophy according to which a distribution 
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is good when it creates the greatest sum of benefits (Parfit, 1997: 205). According to this princi-
ple, a surf break should be given to those making the greatest use of it, here understood in terms 
of preference satisfaction. This gives us a general rule to start. If surfers create a greater utility 
the better they perform, the utility principle endorses the performance doctrine.  
In turn, let us consider two versions of this relation. Firstly, we can assume that personal utility is 
what matters. In surfing, preference satisfaction can be measured by how much each individual 
person enjoys riding a wave. High performing surfers could claim the best waves for themselves 
because they are better able to maximize their individual enjoyment by doing fancier manoeu-
vres than beginners and intermediates. It seems intuitively plausible that a good surfer, doing a 
combination of turns before being spat out of a barrel and finishing off with a rotation in the air, 
enjoys a wave to a higher extent for himself than a beginner who falls from his board on the take 
off, frustratingly getting washed on the shore. But endorsing the performance doctrine in princi-
ple would only be plausible if we could soundly assume that better surfers always have larger 
benefits from riding a wave than beginners or intermediates. 
But there are certainly highly demanded waves that can be ridden by surfers with a large variety 
of skill levels. On a medium-sized day, Bells Beach in Victoria, Australia presumably is such a 
wave – a long right-hand point break winding down the bay in a relatively mellow movement 
offering sections that are not too fast so that even slower surfers can cope with the pace. The per-
sonal utility account doesn’t tell us that we should prioritize better surfers here: Assume an in-
termediate surfer who catches the first 150-metre ride of his life. The sensations he feels in this 
moment are likely to give him a greater enjoyment than a pro rider who considers this wave to be 
just of average quality. 
5.5 Overall Utility: Maximising Aggregated Benefits? 
But what if we consider overall utility as our benchmark of what a good distribution is, that is 
utility understood as maximising benefits for the society in general? High performing professio-
nal surfers often show up on a surf spot entouraged with film-makers and photographers. Assume 
a professional riding a beautiful wave, doing an incredible manoeuvre which is recorded by the 
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media crew and consequently spread over the internet. The footage arguably creates the greatest 
utility possible as the excitement about an as yet unseen photo or video might match the prefe-
rences of millions of surfers around the planet. Note that on a classical understanding of utility, 
the benefits in terms of welfare jeopardize this effect: The sponsor’s economical success might 
not only make the employees of the company better off but even the rest of the society via tax 
money. Should average surfers leave waves to professionals in that kind of a situation? 
In distributive justice, one of the main criticisms to this kind of view states that focusing on the 
overall aggregated benefit doesn’t allow us to consider how the good is distributed. It can lead to 
highly unequal distributions that are counterintuitive. To illustrate this mechanism, consider a 
surf break which is populated with a dozen of average surfers sharing the waves and having each 
a good time. Now imagine The World Champ, the most successful and best known surfer of all 
time, arriving to shoot a video. To be absolutely sure he can pick the waves he wants, the other 
surfers would have to leave the water and let him go, as he could arguably create a greater bene-
fit in the sense described above when surfing a break on his own. But wasting the waves like that 
is unsound as the World Champ’s privilege would decrease the enjoyment of others. 
5.6 Pareto Egalitarianism, Wave Types and Skill 
We stated earlier that on behalf of Pareto egalitarianism we should occupy empty spots and 
avoid letting waves go unridden in order to increase benefits for everyone. Thus, the World 
Champ cannot send anyone away just because he bestows a great benefit. But what if in a situa-
tion of wave scarcity two (or more) surfers claim the right to go for one and the same wave? Do 
we have any reason to privilege a more skilled surfer over a less skilled surfer here? Consider the 
following case. 
Many surfers consider it frustrating when someone wipes out right at the beginning of his ride, 
dissipating the wave and thereby ruining the opportunity for other surfers. In surfing, preferences 
for different types of waves are largely a matter of skill level: Mushy, foamy or slow waves are 
suited for beginners whereas steep, fast and dangerous ones are for experts as they require high 
skills such as a quick take-off, a steep drop, high speed, a safe ‘line’ on the face and good antici-
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pation of breaking sections to be successfully ridden. In between these extremes, as a matter of 
scale, we have all imaginable varieties of waves, each of which fits one or multiple skill levels. 
This intuition can be expressed with the following rule: If a surfer paddles for a wave, he should 
have a sufficient ability level to complete his ride. The minimally required abilities include a safe 
take-off and being able to ride along the sections with the speed demanded by the wave. 
Note that not only the frustrated crowd, but also the wiped-out surfer himself would have enjo-
yed more, had he picked another wave suited to his ability level. The Pareto egalitarian account 
acknowledges different surfers’ preferences and distributes waves according to these. Both well 
and badly performing surfers are better off as they both have more and better waves, rides and 
enjoyment. 
It is crucial in surfing that waves are ridden according to surfers’ skill levels. Exclusion can furt-
her be justified by pointing at the dangerous consequences for surfers who try to surf waves un-
suited to their ability level, which can result in getting washed over and slammed on the sea bot-
tom, causing heavy injuries. This is even more plausible for reef breaks and big surf where sharp 
corals can bring about deep cuts in the flesh, blunt rocks can cause head injuries, and surfers risk 
drowning from multiple hold-downs. We can thus modify our practically implementable priority 
rule number one:  
Modified First Rule: Don’t leave waves unridden. Occupy empty spots and choose your break 
and waves according to your abilities. 
To sum up, simply claiming priority over other surfers because of one’s better performance is a 
morally flawed view. Performance per se is not a good reason for being privileged in wave dis-
tribution as a surfer’s skill can stem from plausible factors like effort as well as talent or from 
arbitrary factors such as being lucky to have grown up under favourable circumstances. Techni-
cal enhancement of one’s performance can be rejected. Personal utility is a plausible factor but 
not necessarily related to skill, whereas overall utility is implausible. On behalf of Pareto egalita-
rianism, we can send beginners away from an overcrowded spot as long as they find waves that 
suit their ability level equally well or better and they don’t decrease their enjoyment. 
!  19
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255
Fair Play, vol.3 n.1, 2015             Jasper von Alemann: The Distributive Justice of Waves for Surfing
Having considered the moral plausibility of the skill-related performance doctrine, we now turn 
to the third way surfers claim special rights to waves over others. 
6. “First Come, First Surfed”? Seniority 
The seniority doctrine is about the period of time a surfer has surfed a particular break. It refers 
to an experience claim towards the local surf conditions. Having observed a break for a long 
time, assessing different directions and sizes of the swell, wind conditions and tides, such a sur-
fer has better knowledge about a spot due to his experience from having surfed it for a long time. 
The rationale behind the seniority doctrine refers to time. 
Are older surfers entitled to ride a wave before younger ones, due to their higher experience with 
the surf conditions? Such a surfer could claim ‘I have been surfing this wave for decades. I was 
here first and therefore I have priority over you’. Such a claim might intuitively seem plausible 
as an account of first occupancy is the basis for many mammals and may seem hard to shake. 
But as we have shown above with Locke, special rights for surfers cannot be endorsed because 
of their usage of a break, however long they have surfed there.  
Some seniority-driven surf spots are simply hierarchically organized and older surfers tell the 
younger ones which waves they have a ‘right’ to go for. Former professional surfer Sunny Gar-
cia, a long time-resident on the infamous Hawaiian North Shore, has described the hierarchical 
seniority system that runs one of the world’s most legendary surf breaks, the Banzai Pipeline: 
“You know, Pipeline has a pecking order […] and I’m glad that I’m finally on top of it” (Pipe 
Masters, 2013). Such a kind of “pecking order” based on succession might be hard to justify with 
theories of distributive justice. But isn’t there some plausibility in the senior’s claim? 
6.1 Long-term Seniority 
One may argue that some inequalities between generations might be defensible given the fact 
that all young people will eventually grow up and become seniors – thus, as long as burdens and 
privileges due to age are comparably distributed over generations, we have some reason to con-
sider deviations from equality as fair. Such an account has been called whole lives egalitarianism 
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(Holtug & Lippert-Rasmussen, 2007: 10). From this view, we might have reason to grant the el-
derly some privileges in the distribution of waves. 
Thus, should a younger surfer accept a disadvantaged treatment in the allocation of waves in fa-
vour of a more experienced surfer, plainly because of the time factor, relying on the fact that one 
day, he himself might be ‘on top of the pecking order’? Such a view is flawed because the youn-
ger surfer might possibly die tomorrow (for whatever reasons but especially on life-threatening 
surf spots such as Pipeline ) – without having the chance to compensation in terms of waves 10
while growing up. Whole lives egalitarianism is not a satisfying account to ground special rights 
for seniors in surfing. 
For a time-related justification of localism, we have to consider more than plainly the time di-
mension. A more plausible way to ground special rights for a senior surfer would have to add 
some extra criterion to simple age. Consider the Honourable Senior who has contributed to the 
preservation or maintenance of a surf spot. Let us imagine he has engaged in activism to prevent 
a break from disappearing because of a planned harbour jetty. The protest happened in the 
1980’s. Without this senior’s engagement, the break would no longer exist and thus every surfer 
today would be worse off as he wouldn’t be able to surf there at all. Consequently, we can plau-
sibly claim that a younger surfer of the 21st century owes this elderly fellow some special ho-
nours in terms of wave distribution. To ground this intuition, we can appeal to the above outlined 
desert principle. 
Experience over time doesn’t matter intrinsically. Should this finding be alarming to senior sur-
fers? Some reassuring evidence in favour of the elderly comes from the nature of surfing itself, 
as acquiring knowledge of a surf break over time means all the world to surfers. Therefore, in 
practice – at least in situations of the closest-to-the-peak rule –, seniors will naturally be on the 
better waves more often than surfers who are inexperienced with the conditions of the break, 
however skilled they may be in general.  
 For an attempt to list the death casualties at Pipeline, see Transworld Surf (2008).10
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But the time factor might matter in the distribution of waves on an everyday basis. Note that we 
deviate from the narrow understanding of seniority here, but still this factor is time-related and 
morally relevant. 
6.2 Everyday Seniority 
We can point to a sort of instant – or everyday – understanding of seniority. On a busy Monday 
afternoon, Fernando comes to the computer lab at Pompeu Fabra University but all the places 
are taken. We wouldn’t consider sending anyone away in this situation, not even a person who 
was in the place where Fernando had regularly been sitting for weeks.  
Likewise in the distribution of ocean waves, we should give some moral importance to a simple 
rule of who gets out in the line-up within one session. This is a functional principle and it doesn’t 
disadvantage any group of surfers.  We can note our third priority rule. 11
Third priority rule: During one session; first come, first surfed. 
Imagine however, Lydia arrives at the packed UPF computer lab, it is two hours before the dead-
line she is supposed to submit her MA thesis and she sees one of her co-students chatting with 
his friends on Facebook, discussing how funny and exciting their weekend was. Most of us think 
that in this case, Lydia has good reason to claim privileged access to the computer. Does greater 
urgency matter in a similar way in surfing?  
Consider a surfer who is forced to come to a break only at very particular hours, let’s say, within 
his lunch break in the afternoon. During the off-work hours, he cares about his children that he 
raises on his own. We might argue that this is sufficiently good reason to grant this surfer priority 
over another surfer who, other things being equal, can also get into the water later. This leads us 
to a modification of the Third Rule. 
Modified Third Rule: During one session; first come, first surfed – unless a surfer plausi-
bly claims great urgency. 
 Although similar, and in principle egalitarian, ‘everyday seniority’ is different from the ‘doing-turns’ rule: It is 11
actually a limit of how many surfers can participate in a session.
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To sum up, the time factor does not matter on its own when we consider long-term seniority, un-
less the time claim is supplemented with some additional reason. We can think of exceptions 
when seniors add something honourable to their mere experience, for example having actively 
contributed to the preservation of a break. The short-term right of the early surfer is a reasonable 
applicable rule in general unless someone plausibly claims great urgency. This naturally entails 
the problem of defining which cases count as “great urgency” and should therefore be treated 
with privilege, and which cases merely count as a minor urgency. We will not try to draw this 
line here, as it appears to be impossible to take into consideration all the aspects of such a thres-
hold question. However in theory, such a claim of great urgency can be grounded on behalf of 
the priority principle of distributive justice which is the matter of the following section. 
7. An Alternative Rule: Prioritizing the Vulnerable 
On a good day in the autumn of 2013, the author of this essay went surfing in Vilassar de Mar, 
half an hour north of Barcelona. Sharing the waves with a handful of other friendly surfers, the 
atmosphere was relaxed as there were enough waves for everyone. Several peaks were on offer 
but there was one lefthander that broke especially frequently, powerfully, cleanly, and all the way 
down the line from off the jetty covering the little harbour in the direction of the beach. 
When he came out of the water, a paraplegic surfer drove by in his car. As this surfer was unable 
to move his legs, it took him 40 minutes to get from his car into his wheelchair, then into his 
wetsuit and back into his wheelchair. He grabbed his surfboard and rolled down to the beach. 
Left impressed, the author watched the scene and saw him catching a few nice waves on that 
beautiful lefthander, riding the waves down to the beach on his stomach, with a big smile on his 
face and enjoying the waves just like everyone else. Naturally, due to his handicap, he wasn’t as 
agile and fast in paddling as the other surfers. But he still got his waves in a closer-to-the-peak 
scenario, sharing the line-up with stronger, fitter surfers. Why? Because they granted him special 
rights to go for the waves he wanted. 
The behaviour of the other surfers can best be explained with an appeal to the priority principle 
of distributive justice which states that “[b]enefitting people matters more the worse off these 
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people are” (Parfit, 1997: 213). According to this principle, less fit surfers, including many chil-
dren, women, elderly, or precisely handicapped surfers – consider Bethany Hamilton as a cele-
brated example matching three of these criteria  – should be given priority because otherwise 12
they wouldn’t catch waves at all. This leads us to add a fourth point to our practically applicable 
rule book of wave regulation before turning to the conclusion. 
Fourth Rule: Let the vulnerable go. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has examined how plausible the three doctrines of wave distribution in surfing – loca-
lism, performance and seniority – are in the light of theories of distributive justice. First of all, 
we demonstrated with John Locke that waves or surf breaks cannot plausibly be appropriated. 
This finding undermines any surfer’s claim to exclude others from ‘his’ break. We then outlined 
two formal priority rules in surfing, namely the doing-turns rule and the closest-to-the-peak rule 
which are both egalitarian in principle. Furthermore, we outlined Pareto egalitarianism which 
turned out to be a plausible principle that we should never neglect. The rest of the discussion was 
dedicated to assessing the plausibility of the informal doctrines that actually rule wave distribu-
tion around the globe.  
None of the doctrines matters intrinsically. Thus, surfers cannot plausibly refer to claims because 
of their status as a local, high performer or experienced senior per se. With regard to localism, 
the account of brute luck is a strong statement against the view that local surfers have special 
rights over non-locals. The analysis suggested that locals do have general rights outside of sur-
fing that might be intertwined with considerations of economic inequality. Travelling surfers 
must take care not to infringe these. As the issue entails a threshold problem and therefore ex-
ceeds the focus of this paper, further research is required. 
 Well-known professional surfer Bethany Hamilton lost her left arm in a shark attack in 2003, but nevertheless has 12
kept on surfing on a competitive level since then.
!  24
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255
Fair Play, vol.3 n.1, 2015             Jasper von Alemann: The Distributive Justice of Waves for Surfing
Furthermore, we clarified the implausibility of claiming special rights to waves as a result of 
good performance itself. However, it does matter what factors such high skill derives from. Sur-
fers might have a special right to be rewarded with waves for their talent or the effort they show 
in their surfing, but not for other arbitrary factors. Referring to utility has some plausibility with 
regard to the individual surfer’s enjoyment but doesn’t endorse the performance doctrine. An ac-
count of overall utility can lead to repugnant conclusions whereas Pareto optimality is what sur-
fers should aim at.  
Appeals to seniority, finally, cannot plausibly refer to the time-claim over generations without 
supplementary reasons such as having created a good for other surfers. In the short run, however, 
the first-come-first-surfed rule is a reasonably implementable standard to regulate everyday ac-
cess to surf breaks. 
Of all three doctrines, localism appears to be the least plausible. This finding is interesting as it is 
the most prominent of the doctrines in practice, excluding travelling surfers around the globe 
from pristine ‘localised’ surf spots. Perhaps we shouldn’t conclude that there is no justification 
for localism at all. What we can claim is that it cannot be justified on behalf of the theories this 
paper invoked, although we might take them to be the most favourable. Still, the essay nourishes 
doubts that localism in surfing can be reasonably defended at all. Polemic functional statements 
that localism could be justified simply because “it works” (Surfermag, 2013) are undoubtedly not 
enough to ground the localist claim.  
The last section pointed to the priority principle of ethics. The priority view grasps many – if not 
all – of the positions defended in this paper against the doctrines, but it also allows for plausible 
deviations from the egalitarian formal rules. Many people think that to assess topics in ethics it is 
good to be a moral pluralist with regard to the distributive principles one refers to. But if we 
wanted to opt for only a single principle to rule the distribution of ocean waves, we could most 
neatly assess surfing on behalf of the priority principle. This way, we could answer some of the 
left-open questions, e.g. whether the World Champ has priority over other equally skilled surfers, 
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as we could take into account not only the size of personal and overall benefits, but also all other 
factors in the prioritarian calculus. 
Overall, fusing the problem of wave scarcity with theories of distributive justice was a gainful 
strategy. As a by-product, the analysis suggested four applicable rules for regulating overcrow-
ded surf breaks. Being moderate in their claims, they are generally compatible. This is not to say 
they might never conflict, as they are open to a margin of interpretation – for example, what cri-
teria a plausible urgency must meet. Some may be tempted to claim lexical priority of one rule 
over another. Quite to the contrary, the author believes it is more fruitful to leave this struggle 
open in theory but to be tested in practice. 
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